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 Introduction to the U.S. feminist judgments project 
 Kathryn M.  Stanchi ,  Linda L.  Berger , and  Bridget J.  Crawford 
 How would U.S. Supreme Court opinions change if the justices used feminist 
methods and perspectives when deciding cases? That is the central question 
that we sought to answer by bringing together a group of scholars and lawyers 
to carry out this project. To answer it, they would use feminist theories to 
rewrite the most signifi cant gender justice cases decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court from the passage of the fi nal Civil Rights Amendment in 1870 to the 
summer of 2015. 
 As an initial matter, we provided no guidance to our contributors on what 
we meant by “feminism.” We wanted our authors to be free to bring their own 
vision of feminism to the project. Yet it would be disingenuous to suggest that 
we ourselves do not have a particular perspective on what “feminism,” “femin-
ist reasoning,” or “feminist methods” are. Indeed, without such a perspective, 
we would not have undertaken the project. 
 We recognize “feminism” as a movement and perspective historically 
grounded in politics, and one that motivates social, legal, and other battles for 
women’s equality. We also understand it as a movement and mode of inquiry 
that has grown to endorse justice for all people, particularly those historically 
oppressed or marginalized by or through law. 1 We believe that “feminism” 
is not the province of women only, and we acknowledge and celebrate the 
multiple, fl uid identities contained in the category “woman.” 2 Within this 
broad view, we acknowledge that feminists can disagree (and still be feminist) 
and that there are no unitary feminist methods or reasoning processes.  So 
when we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean 
 1  So-called “third-wave” feminists particularly see feminism as a broader social justice issue. 
 See, e.g. ,  Bridget J.  Crawford ,  Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory:  Young Women, 
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure ,  14  Mich. J. Gender & L.  99 , 102 ( 2007 ) ;  Kristen  Kalsem 
and  Verna L.  Williams ,  Social Justice Feminism ,  18  UCLA Women’s L.J.  131 , 169–72 ( 2010 ) . 
 2  See  Katharine T.  Bartlett ,  Feminist Legal Methods ,  103  Harv. L. Rev.  829 , 830 ( 1990 ) . 
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“methods” and “reasoning processes”  plural , all the while acknowledging that 
there is a rich and diverse body of scholarship that has fl ourished under the 
over-arching label “feminist legal theory.” Indeed, those are the methods and 
reasoning processes examined and employed by many of the authors repre-
sented in the book.  
 Nevertheless, in shaping the project from its early stages through the fi n-
ished pages, we as editors have been motivated by a broad and expansive view 
of what “feminism” is. This capacious understanding undoubtedly shaped the 
project in many ways, including our choice of cases, our selection of authors, 
and our edits, even if we did not defi ne feminism for our contributors. We 
leave it to readers to explore the varieties of feminism that are refl ected in 
these pages. 
 Feminist legal theory and scholarship have developed and even thrived 
within universities over the last thirty to forty years. Feminist activists and 
lawyers are responsible for major changes in the law of employment discrim-
ination, sexual harassment, marital rape, reproductive rights, family relation-
ships, and equitable distribution, to name just a few areas . Feminism has had 
a less discernable impact on judging, however, and it is relatively rare to see 
explicitly feminist reasoning in judicial decisions.  More common are judicial 
reliance on the doctrine of  stare decisis  and  judicial use of the language of 
apparent neutrality.  Both of these moves tend to obscure embedded and struc-
tural biases in the law, making it diffi cult to recognize that feminism offers a 
critical expansion of the fi eld for judicial decision making. 
 The twenty-fi ve opinions in this volume demonstrate that judges who are 
open to feminist viewpoints could have arrived at different decisions or applied 
different reasoning to reach the same (or different) results in major decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court.  As the authors reworked their opinions related to 
gender, they applied feminist theory or methods. The resulting feminist judg-
ments demonstrate that neither the initial outcome nor the subsequent devel-
opment of the law was necessary or inevitable. Feminist reasoning expands 
the judicial capacity for equal justice and can help make more attainable 
polit ical, economic, and social equality for women and other disadvantaged 
groups . 
 Goals of the project 
 Although the project has a number of goals,  one priority is to uncover that what 
passes for neutral law making and objective legal reasoning is often bound up 
in traditional assumptions and power hierarchies. That is, all legal actors – 
judges, juries, litigants, lawyers  – engage in their decision making  within 
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a situated perspective that is informed by gender, race, class, religion, dis-
ability, nationality, language, and sexual orientation. For judges, that (often 
unacknowledged) situated perspective can be crucial to the reasoning and 
the outcome of cases. The situated perspective of the decision maker may 
drive American jurisprudence as much as  – if not more than  –  stare deci-
sis does. A  judge’s worldview may inform the choices that the judge makes 
about the doctrinal basis for an opinion. For example, a judge may need to 
choose whether a lawsuit should be decided as a substantive due process case 
about privacy rights or as an equal protection case about gender equality. 
Recognizing that all decision making involves a situated perspective reveals 
that decision makers are affected by assumptions and expectations of norms 
relating to gender, race, class, sexuality, and other characteristics. Despite the 
alleged neutrality of the rules and processes of decision making within the 
U.S. judicial system, values and beliefs shaped by experience may exert a sig-
nifi cant, if diffi cult-to-see, infl uence on the judges’ interpretation and appli-
cation of the law. 
 The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project turns attention to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Contributors to this volume challenge the formalistic concepts that 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions are, or should be, written from a neutral 
vantage point and that they are, or should be, based on deductive logic or 
“pure” rationality. When the project’s authors brought their own feminist 
consciousness or philosophy to some of the most important (and supposedly 
“neutral”) decisions and assertions about gender-related issues, the judicial 
decisions took on a very different character. Feminist consciousness broad-
ens and widens the lens through which we view law and helps the decision 
maker overcome the natural tendency to see things the same way or do things 
“the way they’ve always been done.” Through this project, we hope to show 
that systemic inequalities are not intrinsic to law, but rather may be rooted in 
the subject ive (and often unconscious) beliefs and assumptions of the deci-
sion makers. These inequalities may derive from processes and infl uences 
that tend to reinforce traditional or familiar approaches, decisions, or values. 
In other words, if we can broaden the perspectives of the decision makers, 
change in the law is possible. 
 In addition to exposing the contextual nature of judicial decision making, 
another goal of the project was to learn what “feminist” judging and deci-
sion making would look like, both from a substantive and rhetorical stand-
point. What would the world look like if women and men with self-identifi ed 
feminist consciousness were judges? With regard to substance, we wondered 
which of the many feminist theories would have practical application in judg-
ing and decision making and which laws contained the greatest potential for 
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feminist application. Would we see some feminist theories or methods more 
frequently used than others? Which ones? 
 In terms of language, we wondered whether some feminist judges might 
use language or rhetorical strategies that differed from the original opinions 
in describing the facts or issue of a case, or the applicable law or reasoning. 3 
To some scholars, the very label “feminist judgments” will suggest a particular 
feminist language, but the idea that feminists might speak in a “different” lan-
guage or voice is a controversial one. 4 As our sister-editors in the U.K. observed, 
law is “a powerful and productive social discourse that  creates and reinforces 
gender norms … [L] aw does not simply operate on pre-existing gendered real-
ities, but contributes to the construction of those realities.” 5 We wanted our 
book to open a small vista on what law might look like if feminists were able 
to contribute, in a meaningful way, to that powerful , constitutive discourse . 
 Intellectual origins of the project 
 The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is inspired by a similar project in 
the United Kingdom. In 2013,  Kathy Stanchi attended the Applied Legal 
Storytelling Conference in London where she heard Professor  Erika Rackley 
speak about the U.K. Feminist Judgments project , a volume of rewritten deci-
sions from the House of Lords and Court of Appeal.  The U.K. Project, itself 
inspired by the  Women’s Court of Canada , 6 united fi fty-one feminist profes-
sors, practitioners, and research fellows to supply the “missing” feminist voice 
in British jurisprudence by rewriting, using feminist reasoning, key cases on 
parenting, property and markets, criminal law, public law, and equality.  The 
 3  Some legal scholars have criticized certain traditional aspects of the judicial voice as inter-
twined with the class, race, and gender bias in the law.  See, e.g. ,  Lucinda M.  Finley ,  Breaking 
Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning ,  64  Notre 
Dame L. Rev.  886 , 888 ( 1989 ) ;  Kathryn M.  Stanchi ,  Feminist Legal Writing,  39  S.D. L. Rev. 
 387 , 402–03 ( 2002 ) . 
 4  Compare  Carrie  Menkel-Meadow ,  Portia in a Different Voice:  Speculations on a Women’s 
Lawyering Process ,  1  Berkeley Women’s L.J.  39 ( 1985 ) ;  Suzanna  Sherry ,  Civic Virtue and 
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication ,  72  Va. L. Rev.  543 , 592–613 ( 1986 )  with 
Catharine A.  MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodifi ed:  Discourses on Life and Law 45 (1987) 
(“take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak”). 
 5  Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 6–7 (Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and 
Erika Rackley eds., 2010) (referencing Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989)). 
 6  The  Women’s Court of Canada brought together a group of academics and practition-
ers who rewrote several cases involving section 15 (the equality clause) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Their opinions are now online.  Decisions of the Women’s 
Court of Canada , TheCourt.ca (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:52 PM),  www.thecourt.ca/decisions-of-the- 
 womens-court-of-canada/ . 
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U.K. Project has spawned similar projects covering Irish, Australian, and New 
Zealand law, as well as a project devoted to the fi eld of international  law. 7 
 Having long wondered why feminist legal theory, despite its rich and vibrant 
academic history in the U.S., had not made greater inroads into American 
jurisprudence, we realized that the body of U.S. common law was overdue 
for feminist rewriting.  Kathy Stanchi, Linda Berger, and Bridget Crawford 
agreed to serve as the project’s editors, and a group of informal advisors organ-
ized by Kathy Stanchi  met at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Association of 
American Law Schools to discuss how many and which cases to choose for 
rewriting.  Searching  for a unifying theme that would tie the cases together, 
Bridget Crawford suggested limiting the selection to U.S. Supreme Court 
cases because of the Court’s infl uence on the legal knowledge and aware-
ness of the American public . Although restricting the project to U.S. Supreme 
Court cases limited the doctrinal coverage and excluded important state and 
lower court cases, the benefi t of a unifying focus outweighed the detriments. 
 The editors realized early on that this could be the fi rst of many U.S. fem-
inist judgment projects. Like the U.K. project, the U.S. project might inspire 
feminist treatment of the decisions of other courts or other subject matters. 
For example, future projects might focus on decisions of state courts, appel-
late courts, and administrative agencies. Alternatively, future projects might 
be organized by following traditional subject-matter lines (e.g., torts, criminal 
law, property, civil procedure), or by developing areas of interest (e.g., enter-
tainment law, farming law), or by applying additional critical theories (e.g., 
critical race theory, Lat Crit, critical tax theory). We welcome and invite such 
 future  work. 
 Methodology 
 Even  after deciding to limit the project to decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, we still had to narrow the scope. Beginning with the active duty of 
Chief Justice John Jay in 1789, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided more 
than 1,700 cases. In keeping with the impetus for the project, we decided to 
limit our pool of potential cases to those related to gender, although we all 
agreed that many other cases could benefi t from a feminist rewriting. Our ini-
tial list contained nearly sixty cases . 
 7  See Feminist Judgments Project,  www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015); Northern/
Irish Feminist Judgments Project,  www.feministjudging.ie/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015); Australian 
Feminist Judgments Project,  www.law.uq.edu.au/the-australian-feminist-judgments-project 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
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 To minimize the infl uence of personal preferences and to benefi t from 
the views of a range of diverse and knowledgeable experts, we assembled an 
Advisory Panel to help us select the cases most appropriate for rewriting. The 
panel included twenty-three scholars with expertise in feminist theory, consti-
tutional law, or both. Its members were diverse in race, gender, sexuality, and 
academic background.  We were honored to have the advisory participation of 
Kathryn Abrams, Katharine Bartlett, Devon Carbado, Mary Anne Case, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, April Cherry, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Martha Albertson Fineman, 
Margaret Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Nancy Leong, Catharine MacKinnon, 
Rachel Moran, Melissa Murray, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Nancy Polikoff, 
Dorothy Roberts, Daniel Rodriguez, Susan Deller Ross, Vicki Schultz, Dean 
Spade, Robin West, and Verna Williams.  We asked them to evaluate all sixty 
cases for possible feminist rewriting. Their feedback was surprisingly consis-
tent, and we narrowed our initial list of sixty to thirty potential cases . 
 Having decided to follow the U.K. model of publishing a rewritten opinion 
accompanied by an expert commentary that would frame and provide con-
text for the revision, we next issued a public call inviting potential authors 
to apply to rewrite one of the thirty cases or to comment on a rewritten opin-
ion. Providing commentary for each rewritten opinion was important because 
the original opinions would not be included in the volume. The commen-
tary describes the original decision, places it within its historical context, and 
assesses its continuing effects. Equally important, the commentary analyzes 
the rewritten feminist judgment, emphasizing how it differs both in process 
and effect from the original opinion. By following this format of matching 
rewritten opinion and commentary throughout the writing and editing pro-
cess, we were able not only to include additional voices but also to gain the 
benefi ts of productive collaboration among opinion writers, commentators, 
and editors. 
 In  response to the call for authors, we received more than one hundred 
applications, mostly from law professors, but also from practitioners, clerks, 
and others. Our applicants represented a range of subject-matter specialties, 
expertise, and experience. They were well-known feminist legal theorists of 
established reputation and standing as well as more junior scholars, both 
tenured and untenured. Some were fi rmly grounded in theory while others 
were more familiar with the substance and methods of law practice, including 
practicing attorneys, clinicians, and legal writing professors. 
 As editors, we were committed to diversity on many levels. In terms of cases, 
our almost-fi nal list of twenty-four cases was chosen to represent a range of 
gender-related issues. In terms of authors, we sought contributors who were 
diverse in perspective, expertise, and status as well as race, sexuality, and gender. 
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In addition to the forty-eight authors selected to write the twenty-four opin-
ions and their matching commentaries, we invited  Professor Berta Esperanza 
Hernández-Truyol to write a chapter that would provide an overview of 
femin ist legal theory and an account of feminist judging . The project was 
well underway in June 2015 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided  Obergefell 
v. Hodges , 8 a landmark case on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. We 
immediately added that case, along with the authors of  Obergefell ’s rewrit-
ten opinion and commentary, to the book. The fi nal volume thus includes 
twenty-fi ve cases and represents the contributions of fi fty-one authors and the 
three  editors . 
 Guidelines for the opinions and commentary 
 The purpose of the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is to show, in a prac-
tical and realistic way, that U.S. Supreme Court decisions could have been 
decided differently had the justices approached their decisions from a more 
complex and contextualized vantage. To illustrate this point, we asked the 
opinion writers to engage in a re-envisioning of the decision-making process, 
drawing on their own knowledge of feminist methods and theories, but bound 
by the facts and law that existed at the time. Opinion authors were limited as 
well to 8,000 words (far less than many U.S. Supreme Court opinions) but 
were free to choose to write a majority opinion, a dissent, or a concurrence, 
depending on their goals. A major practical difference between this project 
and real judging is that our authors were not constrained by the necessity of 
persuading other justices. It would have been unrealistic to require, across the 
board, that the authors speculate (in some uniform way) about what might 
have been accomplished through the formal (but not uniform) give-and-take 
that traditionally happens between justices at conference and in the more 
informal discussions among peers in the halls and chambers. 
 Authors were limited in the sources they could use in writing their opinions. 
They could draw only on facts and law in existence at the time of the original 
opinion. Many of our authors chafed at this constraint. But we felt strongly 
that such a source constraint, one of the hallmarks of the U.K. project, was 
essential to the legitimacy and goals of the U.S. project.  To make the point that 
law may be driven by perspective as much as  stare decisis , it was critical that 
the feminist justices be bound, just as the original justices were, to the law and 
precedent in effect at the time . 
 8  Obergefell v. Hodges , 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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 In terms of materials other than the facts and law in existence at the time of 
the opinion, we recognized that our opinion writers likely would be unable to 
avoid using feminist arguments and critiques that emerged after the origin al 
opinion. This was especially true with respect to cases decided before the 
1970s, when the modern women’s liberation movement gained traction in the 
United States. Opinion writers could draw upon theories and philosophies 
that became familiar and widely used after the original decision, but they were 
required to cite only to contemporaneous sources. This struck us as a fair com-
promise. After all, we believe that it is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of 
judging that the decision makers bring to the law their own cultural and social 
assumptions (often uncited). So like any judges, our authors could espouse 
cultural or social views and bring their perspectives to their interpretation and 
application of the law. 
 As it turned out, these restrictions on sources of authority were less inhibit-
ing than expected. Many of our authors reported that, to their surprise, the 
feminist analyses, social theories, and arguments that they wished to rely on 
were in circulation at the time of the original decision, and sometimes even 
well represented in the amicus briefs before the Court.  This was true even of 
our oldest decision in  Bradwell v. Illinois , 9 a U.S. Supreme Court case denying 
a woman admission to the bar. Professor Phyllis Goldfarb, the author of the 
revised opinion in  Bradwell , reports that advocates of women’s rights in the 
late 1800s had introduced into the mainstream public discourse feminist egali-
tarian ideals about women’s participation in professional and public life, and 
they made strong arguments within the existing legal framework to advance 
these ideals. Reports like this from our authors confi rm that our initial hypoth-
esis had been correct: it is not that feminist arguments did not exist at the time 
of particular decisions, but rather that feminist consciousness has often been 
ignored or erased in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence . 
 We asked the opinion rewriters to employ a judicial voice and to observe 
the conventions of appellate opinion writing. Accepting the limitations of the 
genre, we wanted the opinions to sound like opinions – not like legal scholar-
ship or advocacy, which is what most of our authors are accustomed to writing. 
This was important to the project’s realism. Some of our authors found this 
requirement to be both liberating and constraining. 10 While the judicial voice 
is powerful, commanding and declarative, it is also a public voice in which 
  9  Bradwell v. Illinois , 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 10  As noted in the U.K. Feminist Judgments Introduction, “writing a judgment imposes certain 
expectations and constraints on the writer that inevitably affect – even infect – her theoretical 
purposes.” Feminist Judgments,  supra  note 5 , at 5. 
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the judge speaks not just for herself but also for her offi ce. This public, offi -
cial characteristic has traditionally required a certain dignity and forbearance 
in tone as well as a writing style that conveys candor, fairness, and dispassion. 
And while we wanted our authors to have the freedom to write as feminists, 
however they defi ned the term, we also asked them to honor legal conven-
tions such as procedural rules and traditions. For example, while the authors 
could expand on the factual narrative contained within the original opinion, 
they had to limit themselves to the legal record before the Court, unless it was 
appropriate to use judicial notice for an easily verifi able  fact. 11 
 The authors of the commentaries had a formidable task, one perhaps even 
more diffi cult than that of the authors of rewritten opinions. Besides provid-
ing a summary of and context for the original opinion, the commentary also 
had to shed light on the feminist and theoretical underpinnings of the rewrit-
ten feminist judgment. Thus, when the feminist justice implicitly relied on 
non-precedential authority, such as theories or studies that were published 
after the date of the opinion, we encouraged the commentary author to dis-
cuss and cite those works to give credit to the feminist thinkers who made the 
reasoning possible. The commentators had to accomplish all this in 2,000 
words. 12 
 Within these guidelines, the contributors were free to pursue their partic-
ular feminist visions. Mindful of the many diverse feminist views, as noted 
above we did not defi ne what “feminism” is or what the preferred feminist 
view of a particular case should be. While our edits occasionally suggested 
that authors consider the implications of certain works or theories, we did not 
interfere with their freedom to see the case, and its importance, in their own 
ways. Again within the constraints of the judicial opinion writing style already 
noted, we allowed authors to use the argument frameworks, wording choices, 
and writing style that they determined were most consistent with their feminist 
approach to the case. 
 In some cases, we as editors disagreed strongly with a contributor’s approach. 
And, in several cases, the opinion writer and the commentator disagreed 
with each other. We expressed views in multiple rounds of edits, but each 
  11  This also was potentially constraining, as feminist legal theorists have argued that the law often 
dismisses as irrelevant facts, circumstances, and contexts relevant to an outsider perspective. 
 See  Kim Lane  Scheppele ,  Just the Facts, Ma’am:  Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, 
and the Revision of Truth ,  37  N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.  123 ( 1992 ) . We recognized this problem, of 
course, but, on balance, decided that any project could not address every problem of outsider 
invisibility. 
 12  The  Australian Feminist Judgments Project offered an interesting alternative:  opinion and 
commentary together could be 7,000 words, and the author and commentator could split that 
up however they saw fi t. 
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contribution refl ects its author’s view and choices. The reader will see occa-
sional evidence of disagreements between opinion writers and commentators, 
or might detect a failed compromise between the editors, on the one hand, 
and a particular contributor, on the other, with respect to a piece’s substance, 
tone or style. Rather than suppress these disagreements, though, we celebrate 
them as part of, and a worthy extension of, the rich and diverse debate that 
marks a dynamic fi eld like feminist legal theory. 
 Topics and organization of cases 
 The twenty-fi ve cases cover a wide range of doctrinal areas, but a major-
ity concern constitutional law doctrines, such as equal protection and due 
process, or interpretation of federal statutory law such as Title VII and 
Title IX. Nearly half raise equal protection issues, and six address Title VII 
claims. The cases touch on numerous legal issues related to justice and 
equality, including reproductive rights, privacy, violence against women, 
sexuality, and economic and racial justice. Included are core cases related 
to gender and feminism that are familiar and expected (like  Roe, 13  Meritor , 14 
 Geduldig 15 ), but also some less well-known cases that were nevertheless 
worthy of feminist attention, in part to demonstrate that issues of subordin-
ation can arise indirectly as well as directly. Thus, we also included cases on 
immigration ( Nguyen 16 ), the Commerce Clause ( Morrison 17 ), and pensions 
( Manhart 18 ), to name just three . 
 The cases appear in the volume in chronological order from the earliest 
(1873,  Bradwell ) to the most recent (2015,  Obergefell ). This will allow readers 
to consider the evolution of feminism and feminist thought, both in the types 
of legal issues that the Court addressed and the manner in which the issues are 
approached. We considered alternatives for organizing the cases, such as by 
doctrinal categories (e.g. “Equal Protection” and “Substantive Due Process”) 
or by traditional areas of feminist inquiry (e.g. “Reproductive Freedom” or 
“The Regulation of Sexuality”). We determined that these divisions were arti-
fi cial for most of the innovative rewrites in the volume. 19 Most of the feminist 
 13  Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 14  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 15  Geduldig v. Aiello , 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
 16  Nguyen v. INS , 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 17  United States v. Morrison , 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 18  City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 19  The cases in the U.K. feminist judgments book are separated into traditional doctrinal categor-
ies such as “Parenting,” “Property and Markets,” and “Criminal Law and Evidence.” 
Introduction to the U.S. feminist judgments project 13
judgments exceed the boundaries of both traditional legal categories and 
more feminist ones. We embraced the chronological organization as the most 
neutral and free from editorial infl uence . 
 Common feminist themes in the feminist judgments 
 As we expected given the diversity of feminist thought, the feminist judgments 
vary widely in their approaches. In the sections that follow, we have attempted 
to identify common feminist themes and methods used in the rewritten judg-
ments. Although we have categorized the theories and methods used by the 
authors of the opinions, this categorization is loose at best. All of the opinions 
cut across boundaries or fall into multiple categories. 
 In categorizing the common themes that emerged, we found that we cov-
ered some of the same theoretical ground as  Professor Berta Hernández-Truyol 
does in  Chapter 2 . To the extent our description or analysis of the theories 
differs from that of Professor Hernández-Truyol, we note again the wide 
variety of perspectives and interpretations that can arise within the feminist 
legal community. We acknowledge that our views, experience, and situated 
perspectives as editors infl uenced our creation of theoretical and methodo-
logical categories as well as our decisions about which opinions to place in 
which category. 
 The volume contains fi fteen re-imagined majority opinions, four concur-
ring opinions, fi ve dissenting opinions, and one partial concurrence/dissent. 
 The majority opinions are almost equally divided between those that 
changed the ruling (eight), and those that changed the reasoning but not the 
ruling (seven). One author of a majority opinion, Professor  Deborah Rhode 
in  Johnson v. Transportation Agency , attempted to write an opinion that could 
have garnered a majority of votes based on the composition of the Court at the 
time . Most majority authors, however, wrote as if their opinions were persua-
sive enough to have garnered enough votes of their colleagues without regard 
to the practical or political realities of the time. Authors pursuing the fi rst 
approach made somewhat limited feminist changes to the original opinion or 
incorporated changes that refl ected substantial compromises while authors in 
the second group tended to write more expansive opinions with the potential 
for transformative results. 
 Similarly, many of the feminist authors cite to feminist scholarship 
more liberally than mainstream American jurisprudence does, taking 
the implicit view that feminist scholarship is a legitimate and appropriate 
source of authority. Citation to feminist scholarship as an authoritative 
source can be seen in  Professor Aníbal Rosario Lebrón’s dissenting opinion 
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in  United States v.  Morrison  and  Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s 
majority opinion in  Meritor v. Vinson , among others . 
 In terms of substance, the feminist authors in many of the opinions 
decided the case on the same legal grounds as the original, such as sub-
stantive due process or hostile work environment under Title VII. Others, 
however, changed the legal basis for the opinion or added additional ration-
ales. Interestingly, these rationales often raised equality and liberty points 
in cases where the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly did not. For example, 
 Professor Laura Rosenbury’s  Griswold v.  Connecticut rejects the famous 
“penumbra” privacy analysis of the original, fi nding that the contraception 
ban at issue implicated equal protection and personal liberty . Similarly, 
 Professor Kim Mutcherson’s concurring opinion in  Roe v.  Wade rejects 
Justice Blackmun’s controversial “trimester approach.” She acknowledges 
that abortion raises privacy concerns, emphasizing that government efforts 
to control the reproductive decisions of women and not men violates equal 
protection .  Similar changes in the legal underpinning of the decision occur 
in Professor Ruthann Robson’s  Lawrence v.  Texas ,  Professor Carlos Ball’s 
 Obergefell v. Hodges , Professor  Phyllis Goldfarb’s  Bradwell v.  Illinois , and 
 Professor Leslie Griffi n’s  Harris v. McRae . 
 Judging from the substance of their opinions, the dissenting authors 
found a true freedom in being able to write separately. In her dissent in 
 Dothard v. Rawlinson , for example, Professor Maria Ontiveros would have 
made  Dothard the fi rst U.S. Supreme Court opinion to recognize and 
endorse a Title VII claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment . 
Similarly, Professor  Ann Bartow takes an unusual approach in her dissent 
in  Gebser v .  Lago Vista Independent School District, focusing almost wholly 
on the problems with the majority’s treatment of the story of the case and 
only partly on the troublesome legal standard.  In  writing a dissenting opin-
ion in  Michael M. v. Superior Court , Professor Cynthia Godsoe found that 
a gender-specifi c statutory rape law violated the Equal Protection Clause . 
These dissenting opinions add a feminist voice where previously there was 
none. 20 
 20  Three of the cases in which the authors dissented,  Michael M.  v. Superior Court, Gebser 
v. Lago Vista Independent School District , and  United States v. Morrison, were decided on a 
5–4 vote. While it is impossible to know, such close votes invite speculation about whether the 
addition of a feminist justice (in  Michael M., decided by all men, or in  Gebser and  Morrison, 
in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented) might have changed the results in these 
important cases. 
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 Feminist methods 
 A.  Feminist practical reasoning 
 Feminist practical reasoning recognizes that what counts as a problem and 
effective resolutions of that problem will depend on “the intricacies of each 
specifi c factual context.” 21 It brings together the voices and stories of indi-
vidual women’s lived experiences with the broader historical, cultural, eco-
nomic, and social context described in historical and social science research. 
Feminist practical reasoning rejects the notion that there is a monolithic 
source for reason, values and justifi cations, a notion that is often a hallmark 
of traditional legal reasoning (consider the ubiquitous “reasonable person” 
in tort law). Rather, feminist practical reasoning seeks to identify sources of 
legal reasoning and values by drawing on the perspectives of “outsiders,” 
or those excluded from or less powerful in the dominant culture. It also is 
more open to conceding the bias inherent in any form of human reasoning 
or decision making, including its own. 22  Professor Lucinda Finley’s opinion 
in  Geduldig v. Aiello is an example of feminist practical reasoning  as are the 
 feminist rewrite of Professor Pamela Laufer-Ukeles in  Muller v. Oregon  and 
the feminist rewrite of  Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales by Professor Maria 
Isabel Medina . 
 B.  Narrative feminist method 
 Related to feminist practical reasoning is the use of narrative to illuminate 
the effects of the law on individual plaintiffs. While feminist practical rea-
soning may address both the individual story of the case and the broader 
context in which the law is applied, narrative feminist method focuses on 
presenting the facts of the particular case as a story. The story of the case is 
critical to the legal outcome; how the decision maker sees the story, what 
that person sees as relevant and irrelevant, and what inferences the decision 
maker draws from the facts often drive the ultimate decision. 23 Because of 
the centrality of story to law, feminists and other critical legal scholars have 
embraced narrative as a distinctive method of subverting and disrupting the 
 21  Bartlett,  supra  note 2 , at 851. 
 22  Id. at 857–58. 
 23  See, e.g. ,  Brian J.  Foley and  Ruth Anne  Robbins ,  Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use 
Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Fact Sections ,  32  Rutgers L.J.  459 ( 2001 ) ;  Brian J. 
 Foley ,  Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism ,  14  Leg. Writing  17 ( 2008 ) . 
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dominant legal discourse.  Feminist narrative method seeks to reveal and 
oppose the bias and power dynamics inherent in the law’s purported neu-
trality by including and asserting the relevance of facts that are important to 
those outside the mainstream account in law.  Feminist narrative also shines 
a light on facts or topics that the law often shies away from or euphemizes, 
such as sexuality, the law’s racism, or the details of rape or other violence 
against women. By euphemizing or obscuring ugly truths about society, 
legal arguments and legal decisions allow them to proliferate because they 
remain invisible. 24 Narrative method also humanizes the law by focusing on 
the actual people involved in the cases and the harms done to them rather 
than on abstract rules and ideals. 
 Many of the authors expanded on, added to, or structurally altered the 
factual recitations of the original opinions. While our guidelines, in accord-
ance with legal convention, restricted the authors to the record before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, many authors delved into that record to uncover 
facts that had been overlooked, dismissed as legally irrelevant, or otherwise 
deleted from the narrative on which the decision was ultimately based. 
Expanded or re-envisioned narratives are used in several feminist judgments, 
including those by  Professor Deborah Rhode in  Johnson v.  Transportation 
Agency , Professor Ann McGinley in  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., Professor Ann  Bartow in  Gebser v.  Lago Vista Independent School 
District ,  Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb in  Loving v. Virginia , and  Professor 
Lucinda Finley in  Geduldig v. Aiello . 
 C.  Breaking rhetorical conventions 
 Some feminist authors used conventional and traditional judicial tone and 
language, but others pushed the boundaries of the genre. The editors fl agged 
the oppositional language and discussed it among ourselves and with the 
authors and commentators. On balance, however, the editors honored the 
author’s wishes if the author felt that the language was essential to her feminist 
vision. Several of our authors argued that it was sometimes important to depart 
from conventional language and rhetoric because the bias inherent in the 
substance of the opinions is likely to be refl ected, or further obscured, by the 
conventions of judicial writing that counsel in favor of neutral word choices 
 24  See  Kathryn  Abrams ,  Hearing the Call of Stories,  79  Cal. L. Rev.  971 , 971–73 ( 1991 ) .  See also 
 Margaret E.  Montoya ,  Mascaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/braiding 
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse ,  17  Harv. Women’s L.J.  185 ( 1994 ) . 
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and a judicious, impersonal tone. In other words, they could not conform to 
those conventions and fully realize their feminist vision. 25 
 Thus, in some of the narratives of the feminist judgments, readers will see 
an unusual level of frankness as well as a conscious use of bold and explicit 
language or a humbler approach to the Court’s power. So, for example, in 
 Professor  Ruthann Robson’s rewrite of  Lawrence v.  Texas, readers will see 
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly apologize for the damage caused by a 
mistaken prior ruling in  Bowers v. Hardwick , 26 an unprecedented rhetorical 
approach in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudential  history . In  United States 
v. Virginia,  Professor Valorie Vojdik states that the Virginia Women’s Institute 
for Leadership, the remedy offered by VMI to cure its male-only policy, is not 
a remedy, but “misogyny,” marking the fi rst time that the U.S. Supreme Court 
would have used the word “misogyny” in this  way .  Finally Professor Laura 
Rosenbury’s opinion in  Griswold v. Connecticut uses explicit sexual language, 
including a reference to orgasm and the joy of sexual relationships, to convey 
a refreshing endorsement and approval of sexuality as a core liberty and rela-
tional interest . 
 D.  Widening the lens 27 
 Although some authors took an unconventional approach to judicial opinion 
writing, many wrote opinions that are indistinguishable in style, tone, and 
structure from prototypical judicial decisions. In this category, we place opin-
ions in which the authors shifted their focus by looking at what assumptions 
were being made and whose interests were at stake in the original opinions. 28 
While staying within the boundaries of existing legal doctrine and using rec-
ognizably paradigmatic modes of legal reasoning, they relied on alternative 
legal rules; they framed issues more narrowly or more broadly; and they pre-
sented different rationales. In this category, we would put Professor  Phyllis 
Goldfarb’s  Bradwell v. Illinois , Professor  Tracy Thomas’s  City of Los Angeles 
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,  and  Professor Martha Chamallas’s 
 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins ,  among others . 
 25  See, e.g. , Finley,  supra  note 3 , at 888; Stanchi,  supra  note 3 , at 404. 
 26  Bowers v. Hardwick , 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 27  Similar results may be seen when the authors engage in the feminist method that Katharine 
Bartlett describes as asking the woman question: “identifying or challenging those elements of 
existing legal doctrine that leave out or disadvantage women and members of other excluded 
groups.” Bartlett,  supra  note 2 , at 831. 
 28  See generally id. at 848. 
Stanchi, Berger, and Crawford18
 Feminist theories 
 A.  Formal equality 
 Given the history of sex discrimination, many of the opinions confront laws 
that explicitly differentiate on the basis of sex (e.g.,  Frontiero, 29  Manhart 30 ) 
and consequently, the feminist judgments rest on notions of formal equal-
ity. Formal equality is among the earliest of feminist legal philosophies. 
It grew out of a time when sex differences were seen as inherent and 
unchangeable, and as a result, discrimination based on sex was acceptable 
and overt. Formal equality seeks to fi x explicit sex discrimination by assert-
ing that similarly situated people should be treated the same regardless of 
sex or gender and that invidious use of a sex classifi cation is presumptively 
unlawful. 31 
 Several feminist judgments rely on  formal equality principles, including 
 Professor Cynthia Godsoe in  Michael M.  v. Superior Court  and Professor 
 Karen Czapanskiy in  Stanley v. Illinois . Two of the majority opinions dealing 
with equality,  Professor Dara Purvis’s  Frontiero v.  Richardson and Professor 
 Lisa Pruitt’s  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, explicitly mandate  strict scrutiny 
for gender classifi cations, a change that would no doubt have effected a major 
transformation in law and culture . In  Frontiero, four of the nine justices in 
the original decision voted for strict scrutiny, so only one additional vote was 
needed to change the course of legal history. That close vote certainly invites 
speculation about “what could have been” had the justices come from a more 
diverse cross-section of society. 
 B.  Anti-subordination/dominance feminism 
 Although  formal equality succeeded in eradicating most of the explicitly dis-
criminatory laws, many feminist advocates realized that formal equality’s “ sex 
neutral” approach was little help in dealing with more subtle or ingrained 
structural oppressions. As  Catharine MacKinnon notes, gender neutrality in 
law will always favor men because “society advantages them before they get 
into court, and law is prohibited from taking that preference into account 
 29  Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 30  City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
 31  See  Katie  Eyer , Brown,  Not Loving ,  125  Yale L. J. F.  1 , 1–2 ( 2015 ) (“In the statutory domain, 
[formal equality] generally takes the form of an explicit statutory proscription on discrimin-
ation on the basis of a particular characteristic, and, in the contemporary constitutional 
domain, generally takes the form of ‘protected class’ status triggering heightened scrutiny.”) 
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because that would mean taking gender into account … So the fact that 
women will live their lives, as individuals, as members of the group women, 
with women’s chances in a sex discriminatory society, may not count, or else it 
is sex discrimination .” 32 The limitations of formal equality were fi rst apparent 
in the context of pregnancy, but, as many of the cases in this volume show, the 
doctrine is entrenched in law, often to women’s detriment . As a result, many 
of the feminist judgments in this volume embrace anti-subordination doctrine 
and related theories such as substantive equality and structural feminism. In 
several of the judgments,  the infl uence of Catharine MacKinnon’s work is 
also apparent . 
 Anti-subordination feminism is a theory based on the recognition of social 
oppression of certain groups. The theory posits that even facially neutral poli-
cies are invidious and illegal if they perpetuate existing oppressions and hier-
archies based on categories like race and sex. 33 This theory seeks to eradicate 
the more subtle forms of discrimination and injustice without sacrifi cing help-
ful laws that differentiate based on group affi liation, such as affi rmative action. 
Like anti-subordination theory, the related structural feminism locates the 
primary sources of oppression in social structures such as patriarchy and cap-
italism. 34  Professor MacKinnon’s work adds a layer to these theories, positing 
that not only are there manifest power imbalances between men and women 
rooted in the basic building blocks of law and society, but also that these power 
imbalances are eroticized and sexualized to women’s detriment, particularly 
in laws related to rape, spousal abuse and  pornography . 35 
 These theories, often in conjunction with others, appear throughout several 
of the feminist judgments, including  Professor Valorie Vojdik’s concurring 
opinion in  United States v. Virginia  and  Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s 
majority opinion in  Meritor v. Vinson , among others . 
 32  Catharine A. MacKinnon,  On Difference and Dominance, in Feminism Unmodifi ed 35 (1987) 
(“whenever a difference is used to keep us second class and we refuse to smile about it, equality 
law has a paradigm trauma and it’s crisis time for the doctrine”). 
 33  Ruth  Colker ,  Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection ,  61  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
 1003 , 1007–10 ( 1986 ) . 
 34  See generally MacKinnon,  supra  note 32 ;  Nancy  Levit ,  Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and 
the Construction of Maleness ,  43  UCLA L. Rev.  1037 , 1098–99 ( 1996 ) . 
 35  See generally MacKinnon,  supra  note 32 . Some refer to Professor MacKinnon’s work under the 
heading “dominance feminism,” but she herself does not like that term, saying “it’s as much 
about subordination as dominance.” Emily Bazelon,  The Return of the Sex Wars , N.Y. Times 
Magazine at 56, September 10, 2015,  www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/the-return-of-
the-sex-wars.html?_r=0 . On power imbalances and related issues, see also  Kathryn  Abrams , 
 Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in the University,  103  Yale L.J.  1533 , 
1549 ( 1994 ) . 
Stanchi, Berger, and Crawford20
 C.  Anti-stereotyping 
 Anti-stereotyping doctrine critiques the law’s adherence to sex roles and its 
normative judgments about what a woman (and a man) should be. Related to 
anti-essentialism, anti-stereotyping seeks to disrupt the law’s reinforcement of 
traditional roles for men and women. Some commentators credit  Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg with bringing anti-stereotyping doctrine to U.S.  jurisprudence in 
the 1970s. They argue that fi ghting gender roles was at the core of Ginsburg’s 
litigation strategy. 36 Perhaps due to Ginsburg’s efforts, anti-stereotyping has 
found its way into U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence to a certain extent, 
most notably in  Price Waterhouse v.  Hopkins 37 as well as Ginsburg’s opin-
ion in  United States  v.  Virginia . 38 This provided a rich foundation for our 
authors to build upon for their revised versions as they rejected common, 
fi xed impressions of men and women widely held in American society and 
law. Anti-stereotyping theory is evident in Professor  David Cohen’s majority 
opinion in  Rostker v. Goldberg , and  Professor Maria Ontiveros’s concurrence/
dissent in  Dothard v. Rawlinson , among others . 
 In the anti-stereotyping realm, several of the feminist judgments employ 
and cite social science data, readily available at the time of the opinion, that 
undermine widely held beliefs about women and men.  The use of contempor-
aneous social science data is a critical tool to demonstrate that law and legal 
reasoning are often intertwined with and based on unsupported and stereo-
typical normative assumptions about sex roles, masculinity and femininity.  A 
key foundation for Professor Martha Chamallas’s concurring opinion in  Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example, is that courts should carefully examine 
and credit expert testimony by social scientists over the mechanical applica-
tion of traditional ideas about sex and sex  roles . 
 Masculinities theory, a relative newcomer to feminist legal theory, also 
plays a strong role in some of the rewritten opinions. Masculinities theory 
is an anti-stereotyping theory, but where some of the early anti-stereotyping 
theory focused exclusively on women’s idealized roles, masculinities theory 
posits that damaging stereotypical assumptions about manhood also infect our 
culture, and, consequently, our laws. The theory focuses on deconstructing 
the norm of masculinity as damaging not just to women, but also to men 
who fail to conform to that norm. Still recognizing that as a group, men have 
 36  Cary  Franklin ,  The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law ,  85 
 N.Y.U. L. Rev.  83 , 88–96 ( 2010 ) . 
 37  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins , 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 38  United States v. Virginia , 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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more power than women, masculinities also encapsulates the idea that men 
competing to prove an idealized notion of manhood often use women and 
non-conforming men as “props” to enhance their own status power within 
the masculinist hierarchy and to denigrate women and the feminine. 39 The 
masculinities branch of anti-stereotyping theory is evident  in Professor Ann 
McGinley’s revised majority opinion in  Oncale v. Sundowner ,  for  example . 
 D.  Multi-dimensional theories: anti-essentialism and intersectionality 
 Another common theme in some of the judgments was anti-essentialism – 
challenging the notion, prevalent in law and in much of early feminist theory, 
that there is a fi xed and identifi able “essence” that characterizes a certain set 
of human beings, such as women . 40  Relatedly, some of the feminist judgments 
explore themes  of intersectionality, a legal approach that recognizes that gen-
der is only one potential axis of discrimination and that discrimination against 
women is often combined with and compounded by oppression based on 
race, sexuality, class, and ethnicity. Beyond the recognition of multiple forms 
of oppression, intersectionality provides a theoretical framework through 
which the law can recognize and remedy those multiple oppressions instead 
of for cing a case into one distilled category of discrimination . 41 These theories 
are evident in the opinions of  Professor Lisa Pruitt in her rewritten majority 
opinion in  Planned Parenthood v. Casey , Professor  Teri McMurtry-Chubb in 
her majority opinion in  Loving v. Virginia ,  and  Professor Ilene Durst in her 
majority opinion in  Nguyen v. INS , among  others . 
 E.  Autonomy and agency 
 Several authors also relied on agency and autonomy rationales, noting that in 
addition to arguments based on deprivations of liberty under the Due Process 
Clause, the  Constitution provides support for the argument that the gov-
ernment must act affi rmatively to provide opportunities for full citizenship. 
 39  Masculinities and the Law: A Multidimensional Approach 1–5 (Frank Rudy Cooper and Ann 
C. McGinley eds., 2012). 
 40  See  Angela  Harris ,  Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,  42  Stan. L. Rev.  581 ( 1990 ) . 
 41  Kimberlé  Crenshaw ,  Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A  Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics ,  1989  U. Chi. 
Legal F.  139 ;  Devon W.  Carbado and  Mitu  Gulati ,  The Fifth Black Woman ,  11  J. Contemp. 
Legal Issues  701 , 702 ( 2001 ) (“particular social groups (e.g., black people) are constituted by 
multiple status identities (e.g., black lesbians, black heterosexual women, and black hetero-
sexual men)” and the different status identity holders within any given social group face dis-
crimination that is different in both quantity and quality from discrimination faced by others). 
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 Related to agency and autonomy, a true joy in sexual awareness and liberation 
can be seen in several of the feminist judgments. This sex-positive feminism 
is often attributed to third-wave feminists, who celebrate the joy of sexuality 
and sexual agency and tend to reject the tropes of passive victimhood that 
some associate with the second wave. 42  Though, to be fair, the emphasis on 
the centrality of sexual experience is related to, and may have developed 
from, ideas of relational, or hedonic, feminists, who criticize feminism for 
ignoring women’s happiness and emphasize the importance of human rela-
tionships to women’s approach to life and law . 43 Sexual autonomy rationales 
appear in Professor  Carlos Ball’s majority opinion in  Obergefell v. Hodges  and 
Professor  Kim Mutcherson’s majority opinion in  Roe v. Wade, among others . 
 They are especially vivid in Professor Laura Rosenbury’s rewrite  of  Griswold 
v.  Connecticut . 
 Conclusion 
 The richness and diversity of the rewritten opinions, as well as the incisive 
analysis of the commentaries, exceeded our expectations and goals. The opin-
ions and commentaries reveal the breadth and depth of feminism and demon-
strate the viability and practicality of using feminist legal theories and feminist 
methods to decide legal questions. Illustrating applied feminism, the opin-
ions and commentaries refl ect their authors’ informed and distinctive choices 
about the grounds of legal reasoning, the forms of legal arguments, and the 
effects of language use. The volume reveals clearly the situated perspective 
inherent in judging, but also shows that widening the range of potential per-
spectives can make a signifi cant difference. In other words, the law can be 
a dynamic and vibrant source of change, especially if its interpretation and 
formation includes judges of different experiences, backgrounds, and world-
views. We hope that the book will be an instructive, educational, and even 
inspirational resource for academics, students, lawyers, and judges alike. 
 The volume is both an academic text and a practical illustration of applied 
feminism. We hope it will arouse interest beyond the legal academic market. 
The book embraces an educational function regardless of audience. Students 
might learn about the law and feminism. The legal community and the wider 
public might learn about the way law works, what cases mean, and how the 
identity and philosophy of judges matter. For every reader, the book is an 
 42  Crawford,  supra  note 1 , at 117–22. 
 43  See, e.g .,  Robin L.  West ,  The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives:  A  Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory ,  3  Wisc. Women’s L.J.  81 ( 1987 ) . 
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opportunity to contemplate the arc of justice, and the important role that 
feminism can play in achieving it for women and all people who challenge 
trad itional gender roles. 
 A fi nal note on the order of the editors’ names. Because  Kathy Stanchi 
brought the three of us together as editors, we decided that her name should 
be listed fi rst . A coin toss determined the order of the other two editors’ names. 
 From the time the three of us began to work together on the project, this 
has been a collaborative endeavor to which we contributed equally. In keep-
ing with our feminist philosophy, we aimed to achieve unanimity on all edi-
torial decisions. Thus, while we know that citation conventions traditionally 
use only the fi rst editor’s name, this convention does not refl ect accurately 
the equal contributions of the editors to the project. Accordingly, we ask that 
those citing our work use all three editors’ names in the citation. Feminism 
should make a difference not only in judging, but also in scholarship and the 
conventions of attribution. 
 We hope that you are as pleased and excited as we are at the results of this 
collaborative project. Enjoy! 
